The murder of Sharif Osman Bin Hadi, the 32-year-old spokesperson for Inquilab Mancha and a candidate for the Dhaka-8 seat, has left Bangladesh in a state of volatile uncertainty. Shot by masked gunmen on December 12 and succumbing to his injuries in Singapore on December 18, 2025, Hadi’s death comes at a critical juncture—just weeks before the general elections scheduled for February 12, 2026.
Thank you for reading this post, don't forget to subscribe!While his supporters have been quick to blame external forces or the deposed Awami League, analysts and political rivals are looking at a more complex web of beneficiaries who profit from the resulting destabilization.
1. The Traditional Rivals: AL and BNP
Experts argue that neither of the two major political forces stands to gain from this specific tragedy:
- The Awami League (AL): Currently banned and in exile, the AL would see little benefit in a high-profile assassination that only further fuels public anger against them and justifies the interim government’s crackdown.
- The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP): As the frontrunner in the upcoming polls, the BNP seeks a stable environment to ensure the elections proceed. In Dhaka-8, the BNP’s heavyweight candidate, Mirza Abbas, was already vastly more popular than Hadi, making a political hit unnecessary for electoral gain.
2. The Radical Beneficiaries: Jamaat-e-Islami and Shibir
Geopolitical analysts, including Paris-based expert Nahid Helal, point toward radical factions as the true beneficiaries.
- Strategic Vacancy: Hadi was competing for the Dhaka-8 seat, a constituency also eyed by Md Abu Shadik Kayem, a central leader of Islami Chhatra Shibir (the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami).
- Pretext for Extremism: The killing has provided a “perfect storm” for radicals to:
- Target religious minorities and secular media outlets.
- Incite anti-India sentiment to mobilize their base.
- Threaten the Muhammad Yunus administration with toppling if “justice” (defined by their terms) is not delivered.
3. The “Bail” Allegation: Internal Friction
A striking accusation has emerged from within the opposition itself. Nilofer Chowdhury Moni, a leader of the BNP, publicly alleged that Mohammad Shishir Monir—a senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader and former Shibir secretary—had secured bail for the prime suspect, Faisal Karim, on two separate occasions in recent years. This link suggests a deeper, more calculated connection between the accused shooter and radical political elements.
4. Geopolitical Narratives vs. Ground Reality
Following the shooting, Islamist groups aggressively pushed a narrative that the shooter had fled to India, using the incident to attack Indian diplomatic missions and fan communal flames. However, Bangladesh’s Detective Branch (DB) and Special Branch (SB) have repeatedly stated there is no concrete evidence that the suspect crossed the border.
Instead, investigators have uncovered a staggering financial trail. The CID has traced nearly Tk 127 crore in financial networks linked to the shooter, including uncashed cheques worth Tk 200 crore, suggesting a level of funding and coordination that far exceeds a simple street crime.
Conclusion: A Third Force in Play?
As analysts like Marufa Yasmin suggest, whenever the two main political pillars are at odds, a “third, anti-democratic force” often emerges to fill the void. The assassination of Osman Hadi appears to be a tool for this third force—comprising radical groups and those who profit from anarchy—to derail the democratic transition and seize influence through fear rather than the ballot box.
